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This paper examines the time path of saving rates in three Latin American countries–Chile,
Colombia, and Mexico–between 1970 and 2010 through the lens of the neoclassical growth
model. We focus on these three countries for tractability and because they appear to be
representative of the Latin American region. The average saving rate across the three
countries between 1970 and 2014 is 18%, virtually identical to that of the larger pool of
Latin American countries depicted in Figure 1. At the same time, while these countries have
similar average saving rates for the overall period–17.6% in Chile, 16.4% in Colombia, and
19.9% in Mexico, there are marked differences in their time paths, thus providing enough
variability to assess how alternative forces have played different roles through time. For
example, the saving rate in Chile is initially lower than the saving rates in Colombia
and Mexico. After the mid 1980s, the saving rate in Chile increases while it decreases in
Colombia and Mexico, reversing the earlier pattern. In fact, the saving rate in Chile triples
between 1985 and 1988, rising from 8% to 24%. During the same time, the saving rate in
Mexico declines from 23% to 21% while it increases slightly in Colombia.
What accounts for the time path of saving rates in these countries? To what extent
have these rates been related to the forces that have shaped economic growth in the region?
In this paper, we address these questions using a neoclassical growth model where we take
the capital stock in 1970 as an initial condition and feed in the actual time paths of total
factor productivity (TFP) growth, tax rates, government spending, and population growth
for these countries between 1970 and 2014. We conduct deterministic simulations and
examine the path of the model-generated saving rates, as well as other economic variables,
against their data counterparts. We then use the model economy to examine the relative
importance of each of the exogenous factors in accounting for the observed saving rates.
In a final experiment, we counterfactually substitute the observed growth rate of TFP for
that of Asian countries, and assess the extent to which differences in these driving forces
can account for the differences in the time-path of saving rates across regions.
Our findings indicate that two factors, TFP growth and fiscal policy (tax rates and
the share of government expenditures), are capable of accounting for some of the major
changes in saving rates in Chile and Colombia. The model accounts for the low saving
rates in Chile compared to Colombia until the late 1980s and the reversal in the saving
rates after that period, while also accounting for the behavior of capital and labor in the
data.
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Figure 1: Gross National Saving Rate
















Note: The graph presents the simple average of gross national saving rates across six Latin American countries
(LAC6)–Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru–in green; and, individually, the gross national saving rates of
Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. Source: World Bank’s WDI.
Both fiscal policy and TFP growth behave quite differently in Chile and Colombia
throughout this time period. The data series we construct point to a dramatic decline in
the capital income tax rate in Chile from over 50% until 1986/87 to around 10% afterward.1
The share of government expenditure in this country also exhibits a modest decline after
1987. In Colombia, on the other hand, both the average capital income tax rate, and the
share of government expenditure increase substantially during the same period.
TFP growth rates in Chile and Colombia also start diverging after 1987. The average
annual TFP growth rate between 1970 and 1987 is 1.3% in Colombia and 1.8% in Chile.
Between 1989 and 2010, the average TFP growth rate increases to 2.5% in Chile while it
declines to 1% in Colombia. The decline in the tax rate and the higher rate of TFP growth
contribute to the increase in the saving rate in Chile after 1989, leading to the divergence
in saving rates of the two countries.
While the model’s performance–i.e., the extent to which it can account for the dynamics
of savings–is weaker for Mexico, there are interesting insights learned from the comparison
between Mexico and Chile as well. For example, both Mexico and Chile reform their
tax systems in 1987. Yet, while the saving rate triples in Chile between 1985 and 1989,
it actually declines in Mexico. This observation is not puzzling in light of our findings.
It turns out that the behavior of another factor that affects saving rates is very different
between the two countries between 1985 and 1989. The average annual growth rate of TFP
1Available evidence (Cerda et al., 2015; Hsieh and Parker, 2007) confirms this decline in tax rates.
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is -4% during this time period while it is 4.5% in Chile. High productivity growth results
in high returns to capital, incentivizing higher savings. Thus, in Chile, the reduction in
tax rates that coincides with a higher TFP growth results in a spectacular increase in the
saving rate.
We also examine if differences in TFP growth rates between the Asian and Latin Amer-
ican countries can account for the differences in the time path of their saving rates. In
particular, we investigate how much saving rates in Latin America would have increased
had they experienced TFP growth rates similar to those of the Asian economies. We pay
close attention to the 1989-2000 period, where saving rates declined in Latin America but
remained stable in Asia. Our findings indicate that while the counterfactual saving rates
would have been higher in the 1989-2000 period, the decline would still have happened,
albeit later, fueled by changes in fiscal policy. Overall, higher TFP growth rates observed
in Asian countries are not enough to close the large differences in saving rates across these
regions. Recent research on China, for example, highlights alternative explanations that
account for the high observed saving rates including income uncertainty, lack of comprehen-
sive pension coverage, lack of long-term-care insurance, and the decline in family insurance
due to the one-child policy.2 Differences in these dimensions may account for most of the
differences in the level of saving rates across these regions. A more comprehensive study
of these issues is left for future work.
Two strands of the recent literature are particularly relevant for this paper. First, our
methodological approach follows recent research geared toward using neoclassical growth
theory to study macroeconomic phenomena as best exemplified in the volume edited by
Kehoe and Prescott (2007) that aims at accounting for large economic downturns. The
work by Bergoeing et al. (2002) in that volume is closely related to ours as they compare
the differences in economic performance between Chile and Mexico before and after the
debt crises of the 1980s. They argue that Chile recovered much faster than Mexico after
the debt crises due to its earlier policy reforms that generated faster productivity growth.
Unlike this research, however, they do not study the differences in saving rates across the
two countries. Chen et al. (2006) use the same methodological approach by calibrating a
neoclassical growth model to study the behavior of saving rates but focus only on Japan
during the second half of the twentieth century. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first paper to use such an approach to study the dynamics of saving rates in Latin America.
2See for example, Chamon et al. (2013); Choukhmane et al. (2013); Curtis et al. (2015); He et al.
(2015); Imrohoroglu and Zhao (2016); and Wei and Zhang (2011).
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Our work relates also to earlier studies that have analyzed the saving rates in Latin
America although from alternative methodological frameworks. Some works, for example,
focus on the role of the saving rates in Chile relative to Mexico in facilitating high growth.
The spectacular increase in the saving rate in Chile in the late 1980s is attributed to
sustained growth of GDP in Morande (1998), higher total factor productivity and higher
public savings in Holzmann (1997), and financial reforms and implementation of mandatory
fully funded pension systems in Rodrik (2000). The Chilean experience has often been
suggested as a path to prosperity for other Latin American countries. Low saving rates
in Latin America have been a source of concern in Edwards (1996); Loayza et al. (2000);
and Grigoli et al. (2015) while high saving rates in Asia have been hailed as an important
factor in their economic growth (Stiglitz, 1996). Policies geared toward increasing the
saving rate for Latin American countries have been suggested by De La Torre and Ize
(2015) and Cavallo and Serebrisky (2016), among others. We contribute to this literature
by investigating the endogenous response of the saving rate to changes in productivity and
fiscal policy. Our results indicate that both of these factors have an important role to play
in shaping the time path of the saving rate.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the neoclassical
model used and its calibration. The main results of the paper are gathered in Section 4,
including the various counterfactual experiments that we undertake. Section 5 concludes.
Further technical details are gathered in an Appendix at the end.
2 The Model
We use a simple version of the one-sector neoclassical model (e.g., Cass, 1965; Koopmans,
1965). In this model, there is a stand-in household with Nt working-age members at date t.
This representative household decides on labor, consumption, and capital accumulation so
as to maximize lifetime utility subject to resource and technological constraints. Formally,
the household’s objective function is:
∞∑
t=0
βtNt [log ct + α log (T − ht)] , (1)
where Nt+1/Nt = nt is the growth of the household size, ct = Ct/Nt and ht = Ht/Nt are per
capita consumption and labor choices, T is the total endowment of hours per household,
β is the subjective discount factor, and α is the share of leisure in the utility function.
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Technology takes the form of a constant return to scale production function that combines




t , where At is a measure of TFP. Agents’
choices are thus subject to the resource constraint:
Ct +Xt ≤ wtHt + [rt − τt (rt − δt)]Kt + πt (2)
whereXt is investment, rt is the rental rate of capital, τt is the tax rate on capital returns, δt
is capital depreciation, and πt is a lump-sum tax that is used to ensure that the government
budget constraint is satisfied each period: Gt − τt (rt − δt)Kt = πt with Gt denoting
exogenous government consumption.3 The economy-wide resource constraint is given by
Ct +Xt +Gt = Yt whereXt enters the capital law of motion as:
Xt = Kt+1 − (1− δt)Kt. (3)
The optimal saving decisions by households will be determined by the exogenous driving
forces, namely the growth rate of the productivity (TFP) factor, γt = (At+1/At)
1/(1−θ), as
well as Gt, τt, nt, and δt through the way they affect the standard equilibrium conditions



















where c̃t = CtA
1/(θ−1)
t /Nt and and k̃t = KtA
1/(θ−1)
t /Nt are de-trended values of Ct and Kt.
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When calibrating the model as well as when comparing its performance against the
data we will work with the gross national saving rate, formally defined as:
st =
Yt −Gt − Ct
Yt
.
3At first one may be concerned by the omission of labor income taxes. We do so mainly for practical
purposes as data on effective labor income taxes is hard to come by for Latin American countries. For
Colombia we were able to obtain data for 1994-2010 and carried out the benchmark exercise with the
addition of this fifth exogenous driving force. Results (available upon request) showed that that while
the inclusion of labor income taxes does have a substantial effect on labor supply, this has only a modest
impact on the model-implied saving rate. For Mexico we could only obtain data for 1993-2001 (a period
too short for simulations), while for Chile we found no reliable data whatsoever.
4It is worth clarifying that population growth (n) is not present in (4) by construction as variables
are in effective per-capita terms. This does not mean that fluctuations in n do not affect savings rate. If
one rewrites (4) in levels, population growth affects the path of (aggregate) consumption and, hence, the
saving rate.
6
3 Calibration and Measurement
We calibrate the neoclassical model of the previous section for three Latin American coun-
tries: Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. We summarize the calibration results in Table 1. The
model’s time period is taken to be a year. In all cases, the capital share in production,
θ, is set to 0.3, and the depreciation rate, δ, is set to 0.035.5 The remaining parameters
are calibrated so as to match certain features of the country-specific data for the period
1970-2010. Data for saving (GNSR), household and government consumption, working age
population, and gross national product are taken from the World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Indicators (WDI). Total annual hours worked are taken from the Conference Board
Total Economy Database.
A crucial step in our calibration of the model is to obtain an adequate measure of
the capital stock. In doing so, we follow Hayashi and Prescott (2002) and include the
current account balance in investment. More precisely, we first use data on investment and
inventories along with equation (3) to construct a series of total capital in the economy.
To this we add net foreign assets from the External Wealth of Nations (Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti, 2007) database to obtain a measure of national capital. We then use this measure
along with GNP and hours worked to obtain a series of total factor productivity (TFP).
Thus, while our setup does not allow for trade with the rest of the world, the capital
series that we build, which serve as input for computing the TFP growth used, do include
the current account balance as part of investment flows (see also Hayashi and Prescott
(2002)). This adjustment allows us to include the aggregate effects of capital flows into
the model. For example, a large current account surplus in the data, by which a country
exports capital abroad, will be recovered in our capital series as an increase in the stock
of capital. Hence, our setup is partially capturing open economy features by means of
accounting for changes in capital flows that feed onto movements in the capital stock series
that we build. Nevertheless, our framework is not well suited to examining the possible
impact of world interest rate shocks on saving rates. This may be especially important in
the period after the 1990s where market-oriented reforms had increased the openness of
these countries to international trade.
5The value α = 0.3 is also used in previous growth accounting work for Chile and Mexico (Bergoeing
et al., 2002; Kehoe and Meza, 2011). Our value δ = 0.035 is lower than that used in the latter studies (which
is closer to 5%) but corresponds to the average annual depreciation rate for 1960-2013 used by Chile’s
Potential GDP Advisory Council of the Ministry of Finance (DIPRES, 2016) in its growth accounting
exercises and is very close to the average of Colombia’s Central Bank estimate for the 1950-96 period
(GRECO, 2002).
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Table 1: Baseline Calibration
Parameter Description Mexico Chile Colombia
β Discount factor 0.946 0.960 0.933
θ Capital share 0.3 0.3 0.3
α Disutility of labor 3.1 3.4 3.2
δ Depreciation rate 0.035 0.035 0.035
K0/Y0 Capital-output ratio 1.95 2.45 2.5
Steady-state
γ Productivity growth 1.001 1.020 1.014
g Government share 0.107 0.130 0.170
n Population growth 1.020 1.011 1.014
τ Tax rate on capital 0.084 0.120 0.080
Note: The upper panel reports the values for the parameters used in the calibration of the benchmark neoclassical growth
model for each of the three countries considered–Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. The lower panel presents the steady state
values for the four driving forces considered in the benchmark model. Time period used in the model is a year.
Another critical input in our quantitative exercise is a measure of effective capital tax
rates. For Colombia, we are able to construct a time series of such rates following Mendoza
et al. (1994) using data from national sources. However, such data are partially available
in Chile only for the years 1996-2010 and in Mexico only for the 1993-2010 period. For
the missing years we follow Bergoeing et al., 2002 in assuming a constant tax rate of 41%
in Mexico and 56% in Chile during the period 1970-1987 and then in 1988 let the rate
fall to the first value computed using national sources (10.1% in Mexico and 11.2% in
Chile).6 Hsieh and Parker (2007) and Cerda et al. (2015) present compelling evidence
that corporate tax rates were lowered by these approximate magnitudes around 1987-88
in Chile while Urzua (2000) documents that a considerable corporate tax reform also took
place in Mexico around the same time.7As in previous studies (e.g., Bergoeing et al., 2002),
we assume that the tax reforms in Mexico and Chile were unanticipated. To incorporate
this into our framework, we first simulate the model economy for the full period and let
it converge to the steady state using the pre-reform (higher) tax rate for all years (and
6In Bergoeing et al. (2002), the tax rate falls permanently in 1988 to 10% in both countries.
7An important reason for focusing on these three Latin American countries is that serious limitations
exist for other countries in this region in terms of the data required for a proper calibration of the model,
particularly related to long time series data on effective tax rates.
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for the steady state). We then simulate the model again starting in 1988 with the actual
post-reform tax rates, i.e., we “surprise” agents with a tax reform.8
To calibrate the remaining model parameters, we proceed as follows. We choose the
country-specific discount factor so that, given the other parameter choices, the model’s
steady state gross saving rate approximate the average observed saving rate during the
1970-2015 period.9 The model steady state saving rates are 18.85% for Chile, 14.11% for
Colombia, and 17.03% for Mexico; the corresponding period averages are, respectively,
17.6%, 16.4%, and 19.7%. Model implied real return to capital based on the discount
rates are 7.2% for Colombia, 4.2% for Chile, and 5.7% for Mexico. Next, we set the
labor elasticity parameter, α, to match the corresponding average weekly hours worked
per household.10 Finally, we use the initial K/Y in the data for 1970 as a way to pin down
the initial capital stock that we use when solving the model.11
We use a shooting algorithm to numerically compute the equilibrium transition path of
the endogenous macroeconomic aggregates generated by the model as it converges from its
initial conditions to a steady state. This, however, requires us to take a stand on what the
steady state values are for the exogenous variables: TFP factor growth, population growth,
government spending, and capital taxes. For steady state government spending, we use
the period average for Chile and Mexico. In the case of Colombia, we use the average
for the 1991-2010 sub-period instead since the 1991 constitutional change resulted in a
large–and rather permanent–shift in government spending. For the TFP growth factor, we
use the period average in Colombia and Chile; in the case of Mexico, we use the post-1990
average since the average for the entire period is negative, which prevents convergence of the
algorithm. The steady state rate of capital taxation in Colombia corresponds to the post-
1991 average (again due to a large permanent increase observed after the constitutional
change), while for Chile and Mexico, we use the post-reform (i.e., post-1988) average. For
(working age) population growth in all three cases, we use the last available value from the
WDI (2014).
8While this method allows us to incorporate such tax reforms as unexpected events, our methodology
abstracts from the effects that uncertainty can have on saving decisions, as opposed to other works that
have incorporated uncertainty in the non-linear solution method employed (e.g. Mendoza (2010)).
9From equation (4) it can be seen that, since both β and τ affect the capital accumulation decision,
these results could also be obtained by using an identical discount factor for all countries but different
capital “wedges” that can possibly account for mismeasurement in our capital tax rates or other distortions
to the accumulation of capital.
10The average weekly hours worked from the Conference Board Total Economy Database are: 22.5 in
Chile, 23.4 in Colombia, and 24.5 in Mexico.
11Given that Y is endogenous and ultimately a solution of the set of non-linear equations the equilibrium
K/Y for 1970 may differ from the K/Y in the data.
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Figure 2 displays the data for the four driving forces between 1970 and 2010 for each of
the three countries considered, and the their assumed values for 2011 and onward.12 There
are significant similarities and differences between the countries in these exogenous factors.
It is evident from the first panel that TFP in Chile grew much faster than in Colombia
and Mexico, leading to a higher level of TFP by the mid-1980s. Tax rates were much
higher in Chile and Mexico compared to Colombia and were lowered significantly in the
mid-1980s. The share of government consumption in GNP fell in Chile in the mid-1980s
while it increased in Mexico and more so in Colombia after the new constitution in 1991.
Population growth rates fell in all the countries after the mid-1980s with Chile displaying
the lowest and Mexico the highest levels overall.
12We present the evolution of the TFP factor in levels merely to facilitate comparison, but notice that
it is the growth rates that are presented in Table 1, not the levels, that enter the model’s equilibrium
equations.
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Figure 2: Four Driving Forces

















































Note: The four plots present the time series for each of the four driving forces considered–TFP growth (γt), capital tax
rate (τt), government spending (Gt/Yt), and population growth rate (nt)– when simulating/calibrating the benchmark
neoclassical growth model across the three Latin American countries considered: Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. The shaded
region (2011-2030) shows the assumed behavior of these driving forces in steady state. See text and appendix for details and
sources used in each driving force.
4 Benchmark Results
Figure 3 presents the simulated GNSR in Colombia, Chile, and Mexico between 1970 and
2010 generated with our benchmark economies when time series data for all five driving
forces –the tax rate, the share of government consumption in GNP, and the growth rates
of the TFP factor and population– are fed into the calibrated models.13 Figure 3 also
13With our exogenous driving forces assumed to reach their steady state values after 2011, saving rates
after 2011 converge rather quickly to their steady state values (see Figure 17 in Appendix A.5). Also, while
our focus is on national saving rates, our calibration incorporates the government budget and redistributes
the surplus/deficit to the households in a lump-sum fashion as shown in equation 2. In Appendix A.4, we
provide the data on public and private saving behavior in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, which shows that
private savings accounts for most of the variation of total saving rates.
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displays the observed GNSR in the three countries so we can compare the model’s ability
to account for the actual behavior of saving rates. We present further evidence of the
model’s performance in terms of capturing other dynamics in the data in Figure 4, where
we report the model’s generated hours worked and capital-to-output ratio together with
their data counterparts for the three countries. Notice that in this model, the saving
rate can change for two reasons. First, as in the standard neoclassical model, the saving
rate may change as the capital intensity converges to that of the economy’s steady state.
Secondly, in any given period, the saving rate may change because of current or (perfectly
anticipated) future changes in each of the four driving forces. In our specific application
for these three specific countries, however, the initial values for K/Y are not too far from
those of the steady state (except for Mexico), so that fluctuations in the saving rate come
mostly from the exogenous driving forces.14
Figure 3: Saving Rate: Model and Data



































Note: The plots present the observed gross national saving rate (“data,” blue/solid) and the simulated one using the calibrated
benchmark neoclassical model (“model,” red/dashed) when all four driving forces are used for the three Latin American
countries considered: Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. Sources: World Bank’s WDI and authors’ calculations.
The main takeaway from Figure 3 is the relatively good performance of the model in
terms of its ability to account for the broad dynamics of the saving rates observed during
the 40 year period of analysis, particularly in the cases of Chile and Colombia. For the case
of Chile, the model captures the dramatic increase in the saving rate in the mid-1980s and
its decline in the previous years. Similarly, for Colombia, the model captures the decline
from around 15%-20% from 1970 until the mid-1990s to around 10% in the early 2000s
as well as its subsequent recovery. In the case of Mexico, the performance of the model
is relatively weaker as the simulated saving rates display more short-run fluctuations than
14Figure 14 in the Appendix confirms this. The initial and steady state values of K/Y are, respectively:
for Chile, 2.28 and 2.8; for Colombia, 2.47 and 2.33; and for Mexico, 1.3 and 3.0.
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are observed in the data. Nonetheless, the model does account for the long-run trends
in the Mexican saving rate: an increase in the first years of the sample up to the early
1990s followed by a decline until the early 2000s and a recovery since then. These relative
differences in the performance of the model can be seen in the correlations between the
data and the model-generated saving rates: 0.70 for Chile, 0.75 for Colombia, and 0.42 for
Mexico.
Figure 4 also documents the calibrated model’s ability to account for part of the dy-
namics of the inputs used in production, capital, and labor. For Chile, the model accounts
for the relative increase of labor in the second half of the sample as well as the U-shaped
path of the capital-to-output ratio across the 40 years of analysis. The correlations across
model and data are 0.64 and 0.52 for labor and capital-to-output. In Colombia, the model
can also replicate the behavior of labor in the second half of the sample and the gradual
accumulation of capital’s share until the 2000s, when the trend reverses.The correlations
across model and data are 0.45 and 0.57 for labor and capital-to-output. For Mexico,
again, the performance of the model is more modest, capturing only the upward trend in
the capital-to-output ratio throughout the sample. Here the correlation in labor is actually
negative (-0.45), although it is high for the capital-to-output (0.86).
There are, nonetheless, some dynamics that the simulated time series exhibit that are
counterfactual. In terms of the saving rates, the model displays relatively larger fluctuations
than in the data. This is particularly the case for Mexico, though it also holds for the other
two countries.15 In addition, the model generates a declining saving rate in the late 2000s
for Chile, while in the data we observe a steady saving rate. In Colombia, the model
generates a sharp decline in the saving rate in 1999 that is not observed in the data.
In terms of capital and labor inputs, in the early years, the model-generated hours
worked misses some of the major changes observed in the data in Chile and Colombia. For
example, hours worked declines dramatically in Colombia in the mid-1980s, and the model
is not able to capture this. In Chile, the model-implied hours worked increases significantly
in the late 1970s while in the data hours worked remain stable. For Mexico, neither the
level nor the dynamics of hours worked are well captured by the model, and the level of
the capital-to-output ratio is not properly matched.
15A statistic that summarizes this behavior is the ratio of standard deviations from the simulated series
and the data. This number is 1.52 for Chile, 1.54 for Colombia, and 1.91 for Mexico. In other words, the
standard deviation of the simulated series in Mexico is 91% higher than that of the observed series.
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Figure 4: Labor and Capital: Model and Data














































































Note: The plots present the time series for labor, measured in hours per week, in the left column, and capital-to-output shares
in the right column from the data (“data,” blue/solid) and the simulated one using the calibrated benchmark neoclassical
model (“model,” red/dashed) when all four driving forces are used, for the three Latin American countries considered: Chile,
Colombia, and Mexico. Sources: World Bank’s WDI, Conference Board Total Economy Database, and authors’ calculations.
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There are, of course, multiple reasons for the discrepancies between the model-generated
results and the data. The model’s counterfactually high volatility is likely to be a conse-
quence of the perfect foresight assumption as discussed in Chen et al. (2006).16 In addition,
there are potential measurement issues that are likely to impact the TFP series obtained
from the data.17 We also have not incorporated any life-cycle reasons for savings such as
the changes in the social security system that happened during this time period in Chile
or changes that may have taken place in other social insurance programs (see footnote
20). Our framework presents an attempt to understand how the national saving rate is
affected by three simple factors: changes in demographics, fiscal policy, and the growth
rate of productivity. In the next section, we investigate the role these different factors play
in generating the benchmark results by running a set of counterfactual experiments.
4.1 Counterfactuals
In this section, we present a set of counterfactual experiments to isolate the impact of
the exogenous factors on the time path of the saving rate in each country. We focus on
Chile and Colombia, the two countries where the performance of the model is satisfactory
in accounting for the observed dynamics of saving rates.18 We investigate the role of the
productivity growth rate by setting all three remaining exogenous processes equal to their
long-run averages. This experiment allows us to isolate the impact of productivity growth
on the saving rate. Next, we examine the role of changing demographics by setting all
exogenous variables except the population growth rate equal to their long-run averages.
Lastly, we examine the role of fiscal policy by only allowing G/Y and tax rates to change
16In a model with perfect foresight, saving rates react to changes in the TFP growth rate with large
swings. That is why, for example, in Chile saving rate after 1990 is larger than the data. This results
in K/Y to be larger in the model especially after 1990s in Chile. Notice that the opposite happens in
Colombia around year 2000. TFP declines a lot in that period which leads to a large decline in the saving
rate. Again, this decline is larger than the one observed in the data, mostly due to the perfect foresight
assumption. This leads the model generated K/Y to be lower than its data counterpart starting around
year 2000.
17Note that we do not adjust the capital input for variable capacity utilization when constructing our
measures of TFP. Nonetheless, for the countries (and years) for which data on capacity of capital utilization
rates exist–Chile (1970-2010) and Colombia (1980-2010)–we provide evidence in the Appendix that results
are strongly robust when one does account for this additional dimension. Indeed, TFP growth rates with
and without capacity utilization rates are strongly correlated in both Chile (0.98) and Colombia (0.85) for
the sub periods mentioned above.
18The results of the counterfactuals for Mexico are, nonetheless, presented in the Appendix. They
suggest that a possible culprit for the model’s poor performance is an overly volatile TFP series, which in
turn may be a symptom of poorly measured production inputs (capital and labor).
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as they did in the data while we set the TFP and population growth rates equal to their
long-run averages.19
Our findings indicate a small impact of the change in demographics on the time path of
the saving rate. Therefore, we present those results in the Appendix. The main question
that remains is the role of productivity growth versus fiscal policy in accounting for the
changes in the saving rate. That is what we examine next in detail for each country.
4.1.1 Chile
In the left panel of Figure 5, labeled “Chile: TFP only,” we present the model generated
saving rate for Chile when the only time-series path used in the simulations is the TFP
factor growth rate. All other factors are set to their long-run averages. For comparison,
the saving rate generated by the benchmark economy and the data are also included in
the same graph. The saving rate obtained in this counterfactual reveals some interesting
observations. First, for many periods, the saving rate generated in this counterfactual
resembles the one in the benchmark economy. In particular, the fluctuations observed in
the saving rate seem to be mostly due to the changes in the growth rate of the TFP factor.
Indeed, the saving rate with “TFP only” seems to generate some of the major changes in
the saving rate. For example, between 1980 and 1982, the saving rate in Chile declines from
13.6% to 1.1%. The counterfactual experiment “TFP only” does indeed generate a large
decline in the model as well, albeit too large compared to the data. The observed growth
rate of the TFP factor declines from 2.3% in 1980 to -13.7% in 1982. This decline alone
seems to generate a large decrease in the saving rate in that period. In fact, it is useful
to compare the results generated by the alternative counterfactual experiment displayed
in the right panel of Figure 5, labeled “Chile: Fiscal policy only.” In this case, the TFP
factor growth rate is set to its long-run average while the actual G/Y and tax rates that
are observed in the data are used in the simulations. Notice that in this counterfactual
experiment there is no decline in the saving rate between 1980 and 1982. Thus, between
the two exogenous forces, our results identify the TFP growth rate as the culprit behind
the decline in the saving rate between 1980 and 1982 in Chile.
19Note that looking at G/Y and tax rates separately implies additional changes in πt, the lump sum tax
that is used to ensure that the government budget constraint is satisfied. Given the large changes in G/Y,
we think it is appropriate to consider both driving forces to be active at the same time when studying the
effects of fiscal policy. In Appendix A.2, Figure 12 we isolate the effect of capital income taxation on the
one hand, and government spending with lump-sum taxes on the other.
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Another dramatic change in the saving rate takes place between 1984 and 1988 where
the observed saving rate increases from 2% to 24%. In our first counterfactual experiment,
“TFP only,” there is an increase in the saving rate that starts in 1983, but the increase
is much more subdued compared to the data. For example, in 1988, the model-generated
saving rate with “TFP only” generates a saving rate of about 9%. In the second coun-
terfactual experiment, “fiscal policy only,” the saving rate does indeed show a dramatic
increase, reaching 33% by 1988. The actual timing of the increase, however is later than
in the data. In the model, the tax reform takes effect in 1987, which is why the saving rate
in this counterfactual experiment increases dramatically after that year. The gradual in-
crease in the saving rate observed in the benchmark economy after 1983 and before the tax
reform is, therefore, due to the increase in the productivity growth rate.20 As mentioned
before the “fiscal policy only” experiment combines changes in both the G/Y and capital
taxation. In Section A.2 we run counterfactual experiments designed to seperate the effect
of G/Y from capital taxes and show that the main driving force in this experiment is the
changes in the tax rate. Changes in G/Y alone have little effect on the saving rate itself.
Lastly, we can also uncover the reasons why the model-generated saving rate diverges
from the data after 2005. In the data, the saving rate hovers around 20% between 2005
and 2010. Yet, in the model, the saving rate declines during this period. The reason for
this decline appears to be the path of the TFP factor growth rate used in the simulations.
Indeed, TFP growth in Chile in this last part of the sample is considerably slower than
the historical average, largely boosted by the relatively high TFP growth rates observed
in parts of the 80s and 90s.
We conclude that both the changes in the TFP factor growth rate and changes in fiscal
policy that allowed for a large decline in the tax rate in 1987 play an important role in
shaping the time path of the saving rate in Chile. The relative importance of these two
factors, however, is different in different time periods.
20While we do not directly model the Social Security reform that took place in Chile in 1981, where the
pay-as-you-go system was replaced with a funded system, we do incorporate the decline in the tax rates
that took place during this time. The early periods of the transition were marked with high government
deficits while the government promised to fulfill its obligations toward the current old generations. In fact,
a detailed study of the role of pension reform on saving rates can be found in Holzmann (1997), which
concludes that the contribution of pension reform to national saving was negative between 1981 and 1988.
Thus, the dramatic increase in the saving rate that took place during this period is unlikely to be caused
by the social security funds of the new system.
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Figure 5: Saving Rate in Chile: Counterfactual Experiments
























Note: The left plot compares the observed gross national saving rate in Chile (“data,” blue/solid) against the counterfactual
case in which the only driving force that is active when simulating the model is the TFP growth rate and the remaining three
driving forces are set equal to their steady state levels (“TFP only,” red/marker). The right plot compares the observed gross
national saving rate in Chile (“data,” blue/solid) against the counterfactual case in which the only two driving forces that
are active when simulating the model are the capital tax rates and the government spending shares while the remaining two
driving forces are set equal to their steady state levels (“fiscal policy only,” red/marker). Both plots also present the simulated
series using the calibrated benchmark neoclassical model when all four driving forces are used (“benchmark,” red/dashed).
Sources: World Bank’s WDI and authors’ calculations.
4.1.2 Colombia
The saving rate in Colombia fluctuates around 18% from 1970 to 1994, declines to 13%
between 1995 and 2001, and fully recovers by 2010. Two driving forces go through major
changes in this period. First, there is a decline in the TFP growth rate after 1995. The
average TFP growth rate between 1970 and 1995 is 1.34%. Starting in 1996, the TFP
growth rate declines to around zero. In fact, the average TFP growth rate between 1996
and 2000 is 0%. After 2002, the TFP growth rate recovers to generate an average growth
rate of 1.8 % between 2002 and 2010. The second development, in the mid-1990s, is the
large increase in the share of government expenditures in GNP accompanied by an increase
in taxes as displayed in Figure 2. This ratio increases from roughly 10% throughout the
early 1990s to 23% in 1999 while the tax rate increases from around 3% until 1990 to
around 10% in the mid-2000s.
In the next two counterfactual experiments, we isolate the impact of TFP growth versus
fiscal policy on the time path of the saving rate. The left panel in Figure 6 displays the
saving rate in the counterfactual experiment where we only feed in the time series path of
the TFP growth rate. Notice that the saving rate generated in this experiment is similar
to the benchmark case except for certain periods. In particular, this counterfactual does
not capture the decline in the saving rate that occurs in the data in 1996.
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Figure 6: Saving Rate in Colombia: Counterfactual Experiments




























Note: The left plot compares the observed gross national saving rate in Colombia (“data,” blue/solid) against the coun-
terfactual case in which the only driving force that is active when simulating the model is the TFP growth rate and the
remaining three driving forces are set equal to their steady state levels (“TFP only,” red/marker). The right plot compares
the observed gross national saving rate in Colombia (“data,” blue/solid) against the counterfactual case in which the only
two driving forces that are active when simulating the model are the capital tax rates and the government spending shares
while the remaining two driving forces are set equal to their steady state levels (“fiscal policy only,” red/marker). Both plots
also present the simulated series using the calibrated benchmark neoclassical model when all four driving forces are used
(“benchmark,” red/dashed). Sources: World Bank’s WDI and authors’ calculations.
The counterfactual experiment that is depicted in the right panel of Figure 6 where
the exogenous path of taxes and G/Y are included is, however, better able to capture
the decline in the saving rate in the 1990s. In this “fiscal policy only” experiment, the
saving rate actually starts declining earlier than in the data. Moreover, further analysis
in Appendix A.2 reveals that, overall, government expenditures appear to have mattered
more than capital taxes.
As in the case of Chile, one conclusion that can be drawn from these two experiments
is that both factors play a role in the decline of the saving rate between 1995 and 2001,
while the behavior in the years before appears mostly driven by TFP growth. The increase
in the size of the government in the 1990s results in the sharp decline in the saving rate
early in this episode while the low TFP growth rate prolongs the decline in the saving
rate into 2001. The recovery observed in the saving rate by 2010, however, seems to be
mostly accounted for by the TFP growth rate. In the second counterfactual experiment
“fiscal policy only,” the saving rate remains stable after the year 2000. In the “TFP only”
experiment, the saving rate gradually increases to around 18% in 2010, similar to what is
observed in the data.
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4.2 Comparisons Across Countries
Note that in our model saving and investment rates are the same. While it is well known
that investment rates move closely with TFP, our results indicate that changes in other
exogenous variables also play a significant role in the time path of saving rates. The analyses
conducted so far identifies fiscal policy, in addition to TFP, as playing an important and
distinct role in shaping the time path of the saving rates at different time periods in
Colombia and Chile. In this section, we examine the extent to which these two factors
may explain the differences in saving rates across these two countries. This exercise may
be particularly interesting given the reversal in the saving rate between the two countries.
Until the mid-1980s, the saving rate in Colombia is higher than the saving rate in Chile.
This is completely reversed after the mid-1980s, and the saving rate in Chile remains much
higher than that of Colombia until the end of the period analyzed.
4.2.1 Chile Versus Colombia
In the left panel of Figure 7, we present the data for the saving rates in the two countries
together. In the right panel, we present the results obtained from the benchmark model.
The model mimics some of the similarities and the differences between the two countries
rather well. In particular, the model is able to capture the initial low saving rates in
Chile relative to Colombia and the reversal in the saving rates of the two countries in
1988. The average saving rate before 1988 is 17.5% in Colombia and 11.4% in Chile. The
model-generated average saving rates for this period are 19.6% and 14.6% for Colombia
and Chile, respectively. For the period after 1988, the average saving rate in the data is
15.6% for Colombia and 22.7% for Chile, while the model generates an average saving rate
of 14.6% and 24.3% for Colombia and Chile, respectively. These results are summarized
in the first four columns of Table 2.
Next, we investigate the extent to which differences in TFP growth and/or fiscal policies
between these countries might account for the reversal in their saving rates. Before 1989,
annual TFP growth rates in Colombia and Chile are similar to each other with an average
of 1.3% and 1.8% in the two countries between 1970 and 1988. From 1989 until 2010,
however, the average TFP growth rate in Colombia declines to 0.9% while it increases to
2.5% in Chile. In addition, tax rates and government expenditures decline dramatically in
Chile in the mid-1980s while they continue increasing in Colombia.
We examine to what extent the reversal in TFP growth rates and the changes in the
path of fiscal policy might have impacted the reversal in their saving rates by running two
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counterfactual experiments. In the first one, we subject the Colombian economy to the
Chilean TFP growth rate starting in 1989. The model economy otherwise is calibrated to
the Colombian economy. The results are displayed in column “Exp. 1” in Table 2. The
results reveal that the saving rate in Colombia would have been two percentage points
higher, relative to the benchmark, after 1989 if Colombia had experienced the same TFP
growth rate as in Chile (16.6% vs 14.6%). Nevertheless, the saving rate after 1989 would
not have risen to the levels seen in Chile in this sub period (22.7%). In the next experiment,
we assume that tax rates and government expenditures as a percent of GDP in Colombia
continue at their levels in 1988.21 The results are displayed in column “Exp. 2” in Table 2
where the saving rate in the 1989-2010 period increases by another percentage point (17.6).
Figure 7: Saving Rate: Model and Data
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Note: The left panel presents the observed gross national saving rates in Chile (blue/solid) and Colombia (red/marker). The
right panel presents the simulated saving rates by the benchmark neoclassical model for these two countries when all four
driving forces are active. Sources: World Bank’s WDI and authors’ calculations.
These experiments reveal that the decline in the TFP growth rate and the increase in
the share of the government in Colombia both play a role in the decline in their saving
rate in the second half of the sample, which stands in contrast to the behavior observed
for Chile.
21In the data, the capital income tax rate increases from 3.9% in 1988 to around 10% in the late 2000s.
Government expenditures as a share of GDP also rise from 9% in the early 1980s to above 16% in the
2000s. In this experiment, we keep the tax rate at 3.9% and the government expenditure share at 9% after
1989.
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Table 2: Saving Rate: Chile and Colombia
Chile Colombia Colombia: Counterfactual
Data Model Data Model Exp 1. Exp. 2
1970-1988 11.4 9.04 17.5 19.4 18.1 17.1
1989-2010 22.7 24.3 15.4 14.6 16.6 17.6
Note: The first four columns present observed and simulated GNS rates with the benchmark model. “Counterfactuals/Exp.1”
presents simulated GNS rate with the benchmark model for Colombia when TFP growth rate is the one observed in Chile
only for the 1989-2010 sub period. “Counterfactuals/Exp.2” presents the simulated GNS rates with the benchmark model
when TFP growth rate is the one observed in Chile only for the 1989-2010 sub-period and tax rates and G/Y continue at
their 1988 levels. Sources: World Bank’s WDI and authors’ calculations.
4.2.2 Chile Versus Mexico
While the model’s performance is weaker for Mexico, there are interesting insights that
can be learned from the comparison between Mexico and Chile. There is a big difference
between the saving rate behavior of these two countries in the late 1980s after they both
reform their tax systems. Recall that in our benchmark exercise, effective capital tax rates
drop from 56% to 11% in Chile and from 41% to 10% in Mexico. Yet while the saving rate
triples in Chile between 1985 and 1989, it actually declines in Mexico. This observation
need not be puzzling in light of our findings. It turns out that the behavior of another
factor that affects saving rates is very different between the two countries after the mid-
1980s. Between 1983 and 2010, the average annual TFP growth rate in Mexico is -0.26%
while it is 1% in Chile. The difference in their performance is even more striking between
1983 and 1988: in Mexico, average TFP growth is -2.94%, while in Chile it is 4.38%. High
productivity growth increases returns to capital, incentivizing higher savings.
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Figure 8: Saving Rate in Chile










Note: Figure 8 presents the gross saving rate simulated by the calibrated benchmark model for Chile when all four driving
forces are active (“benchmark,” red/dashed). The blue solid line presents the counterfactual simulation for the Chilean gross
saving rate when all four driving forces are active but TFP growth rate is identical to that of Mexico after 1983 (“Mexico
TFP”). Sources: World Bank’s WDI and authors’ calculations
To examine the impact of the differences in the TFP growth rates between Chile and
Mexico in affecting their saving rates, we conduct a counterfactual experiment where we
subject Chile to the Mexican TFP growth rate after 1983. The saving rate labeled “Mexico
TFP” in Figure 8 displays the saving rate in Chile for this hypothetical case. Notice that
there would still have been an increase in the saving rate after the tax reform in Chile, but
this increase would have been smaller and much shorter lived.
4.2.3 Latin America Versus Asia
Saving rates in Latin America have been persistently lower than the saving rates in many
Asian countries. For example, between 1970 and 2010, the average gross national saving
rate in the “Asia 5” (China, Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) was 35.5%, while
the average saving rate for the “Latin America 6” (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, and Peru) was just 18.9%. In addition, there were significant differences in the
time path of the saving rates between these groups of countries. For example, between
1988 and 2000, the saving rate in LAC 6 declined from 24% to 15% while it remained
rather steady in Asia 5. During the same time period, TFP growth rates in these countries
were also markedly different (See Figure 9 ).22
22To compute TFP series for the Asian countries, we follow the same strategy as that used in the case
of Mexico, Chile, and Colombia. That is, we use data on investment from the World Bank’s WDI tables to
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Figure 9: TFP Comparison
















Note: Figure 9 presents the simple average of annual TFP growth rate across six Latin American countries (LAC6)–Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru–in red/marker and across five South East Asian countries (Asia 5)–China, Korea,
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan–in black/solid. Saving rate for Colombia is provided in blue. See text for further details
on TFP growth rates. Source: World Bank’s WDI and authors’ calculations.
In this counterfactual experiment, we examine the extent to which differences in TFP
growth rates between Latin America and Asia may have influenced the differences in the
time-path of saving rates. For example, would the decline in the saving rate between 1988
and 2000 disappear if Latin America were facing TFP growth rates as in Asia?
construct a measure of the capital stock, using equation (3). We then adjust this capital stock by adding
net foreign assets to obtain a measure of national capital. Finally, we also use WDI data for output (GNI)
while the labor series come from the Conference Board Total Economy Database.
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Figure 10: Saving Rate in Latin America, Colombia and Asia
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Asia-5 data
Note: The left panel presents the simple average of observed gross national saving rates across six Latin American countries
(LAC6)–Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru–in solid/blue and Colombia alone in red with markers. The
right panel presents the simple average of the gross national saving rates across five South East Asian countries (“Asia
5-Data”, blue/solid)–China, Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan–the observed gross national saving rate in Colombia
(“Colombia data”, black/dashed), and the counterfactual simulated series of gross national saving rate with the model
calibrated to Colombia when all four driving forces are active and TFP growth rate is that of Asia-5 (“Col with Asia TFP”,
red/circles), as well as the saving rate from the benchmark calibration (“Colombia: Benchmark Calibration”, green/solid).
Source: World Bank’s WDI and authors’ calculations.
For this purpose, we take Colombia as a typical Latin American country and ask what
would have happened to the saving rate in Colombia had it faced the same TFP growth
rate as in “Asia 5” during this time period.23 We choose Colombia as a typical Latin
American country because of the similarities between the saving rate in Colombia and the
average saving rate of the group of six Latin American countries displayed in the left panel
of Figure 10. This counterfactual experiment might allow us to generalize about the role of
TFP growth–or the lack thereof–in accounting for the time series path of the saving rates
in Latin America.
The right panel of Figure 10 displays the results for this counterfactual experiment,
labeled “Col with Asia TFP,” together with the benchmark results (Colombia: Bench-
mark Calibration) and the data on saving rates in “Asia 5” and Colombia. Notice that the
higher TFP growth rate does increase the saving rate in Colombia relative to the bench-
mark, especially in the 1990s. For example, between 1989 and 2000 average saving rate in
Colombia becomes 20.4% with Asian TFP growth rates, as opposed to 16.0% with their
domestic TFP growth rates (see Table 3). Differences in the growth rate of TFP between
Asia and Colombia in this period is 2 percentage points. In other words our results indicate
23For this experiment, we use the same benchmark calibration for Colombia except for the time series
path of the TFP growth rate which is the TFP growth rate “Asia 5”. The steady state TFP growth rate
is assumed to be equal to 2%.
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Table 3: Saving Rate: Colombia with Asia TFP
Colombia with Asia TFP
Data Model COL 1
1970-2010 16.4 16.9 18.6
1970-1988 17.5 19.4 18.1
1989-2000 15.8 16.0 20.4
1989-2010 15.6 14.6 19.0
Note: The first two columns present the observed and simulated GNS rates with the benchmark model. Column ”with Asia
TFP/COL1” presents the simulated GNS rate from the model when all driving forces are active but TFP growth rate is
coming from the simple average across five South East Asian countries. Sources: WDI and authors’ calculations.
that if Colombian TFP growth were to be higher by 2 percentage points in this period,
their saving rate would have been higher by 4.4 percentage points. More importantly, the
decline in the saving rate in Colombia would have been delayed until mid-1990s where
changes in fiscal policy started playing a role in the decline of the saving rate as discussed
in Section 4.1.2. However, significant differences in the level of saving rates between Asia-5
and Colombia remain.24
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we explore what accounts for the dynamics of saving rates in Latin America
and the extent to which they have been related to the forces that have shaped economic
growth in the region. We build a one-sector, neoclassical growth model and calibrate it to
a subset of Latin American economies: Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. A crucial element
in our quantitative analysis is to use (and in some cases construct from primary sources)
time series of the forces that have driven economic growth in these countries for the past
40 years.
The main takeaway is the relatively good performance of the model in terms of its
ability to account for the broad dynamics of the saving rates observed during this period
of analysis, particularly in the cases of Chile and Colombia. Furthermore, we reach a
number of conclusions based on our counterfactual experiments. First, both for Chile and
Colombia, changes in the TFP growth rate together with the changes in the tax rates and
24Studies of the saving behavior in China, for example, point to the role of income uncertainty, lack of
comprehensive pension coverage and long-term-care insurance, and the decline in family insurance due to
the one-child policy as some of the explanations for its high saving rates (Imrohoroglu and Zhao (2016)).
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the size of the government have played an important role in shaping the changes in their
saving rates. For Chile, the timing of the increase in the saving rate in the mid-1980s is
affected more by the tax reforms than the growth rate of TFP. For Colombia, the decline
in the saving rate in the mid-1990s seems to be due to a combination of the decline in the
growth rate of TFP and the increase in the tax rate. In fact, these two factors are capable
of generating the reversal of the saving rates in the two countries in the mid-1980s. We
also find that high TFP growth rates observed in the Asian countries would not have been
capable of generating similarly high saving rates in Latin America. Our counterfactual
experiments indicate that the higher TFP growth rate experienced in the Asian countries
during the 1989-2010 period could have increased the saving rate by almost five percentage
points in Latin America. While this is not a trivial increase, it still falls short of filling the
gap with respect to the high saving rate observed in the Asian countries.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data Sources and Methods
To construct the capital stock series, we use data on gross fixed capital formation and
changes in inventories from national sources, which are virtually identical to those reported
in the WDI, along with a constant depreciation of 3.5% in all cases. We use these data
to iterate equation (3) starting from an initial capital value. To obtain the latter, we
use an initial capital to output ratio and multiply by constant prices GDP (from WDI).
For Mexico, this initial value corresponds to the capital-to-output ratio for 1970 in Kehoe
and Meza (2011) of 1.48, which is very close to the 1.51 found in Bergoeing et al. (2002).
For Chile, the 1970 capital-to-output ratio (2.69) is taken from DIPRES (2016), while for
Colombia (2.76), it is taken from GRECO (2002). Once we have a series for total capital,
we add net foreign assets (NFA) in constant prices, which in turn is obtained by deflating
current prices NFA from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) using the investment deflator from
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WDI. The resulting measure of capital is used, along with data on gross national product
from WDI and equation to obtain our closed economy TFP series.
Our labor input series is obtained by dividing total weekly hours worked from the
Conference Board Total Economy Database into working age population from WDI. To
calibrate the labor disutility parameter, we use the period average for this labor input
series and for consumption and output from WDI in the steady state version of the labor
supply equation:




For the years in which effective capital tax rates can be constructed (Colombia 1970-
2010, Chile 1996-2010, Mexico 1993-2010) we follow Mendoza et al. (1994). Formally, we
define:
τ =





OSPUE + PEI +W
(6)
where τh is the effective tax rate paid by households; OSPUE is unincorporated busi-
ness net income; PEI is interest, dividends, and investment receipts; TIPCIH is taxes
on income, profits, and capital gains paid by households; W corresponds to wages and
salaries of dependent employees; TIPC is taxes on income, profits, and capital gains paid
by corporations; RTIP is recurrent taxes on immovable property; OS is net operating
surplus of the overall economy, and TFCT is taxes on financial and capital transactions.
In Colombia, all of these series are taken from the national statistics office (DANE). For
Chile, the data are taken from the OECD’s Revenue Statistics dataset for variables in
numerator of equations (5)-(6) and National Accounts dataset for variables in the denomi-
nator. For Mexico, we use the actual rates reported in Anton-Sarabia (2005) for 1993-2001
and update them using, again, series from OECD and equations (5)-(6).
As in previous studies (e.g., Bergoeing et al., 2002), we assume that the tax reforms
in Mexico and Chile were rather unexpected. To incorporate this into our framework, we
simulate the model economy for the full period and let it converge to the steady state using
the pre-reform (higher) tax rate for all years (and for the steady state). Then we simulate
the model again starting in 1988 with the actual post-reform tax rates, i.e., we “surprise”
agents with a tax reform.
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Our series of the share of government in output is found by dividing government con-
sumption into GNP (both from WDI). Population growth is simply the annual growth of
working age population (also from WDI).
The full data series can be found at the end of this Appendix.
A.2 Additional Counterfactuals
Below, we present three additional sets of counterfactuals not presented in the main text.
In the first of these exercises, we turn off all the driving forces except for population growth.
The results can be seen in Figure 11.
Figure 11: Saving Rate (additional counterfactuals): Population Only









































Note: These plots compare the observed gross national saving rate in Colombia (“data,” blue/solid) against the counterfactual
case in which the only active force is population growth. Sources: World Bank’s WDI and authors’ calculations.
In this second set of counterfactual, we provide two additional experiments to isolate
the effects of taxes on the one hand, and government spending on the other. In particular,
we present an exercise in which all driving forces except taxes are turned off (left panel of
Figure12), and then another counterfactual in which all forces except government spending
are turned off (right panel of Figure 12). The results show that, in Chile, the impact of
capital taxation on the saving rate dwarfs that of government spending, while in Colombia
almost the exact opposite is true.
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Figure 12: Saving Rate (additional counterfactuals): Government and Taxes
















































































Note: The plots in the left column show the model-simulated saving rate that result when the only driving forces at work are
government spending and lump sum taxes (red solid line). The plots in the right column show the model-simulated saving
rate that result when the only driving force at work is capital income taxes (red solid line). For comparison purposes the
plots also show the benchmark model-simulated saving rate (red dashed line) and the observed saving rate (blue line).
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Next, we replicate the exercises of sections (4.1.1) and (4.1.2) for the case of Mexico.
The left panel of Figure 13 displays the counterfactual experiment where only the time
series data for the TFP growth rate are used in the simulations. Notice that this case
generates even larger fluctuations than the benchmark economy. Therefore, the excess
volatility generated in the benchmark simulations summarized in Figure 3 is likely due to
the impact of the TFP growth rate that is used in the model. In the right panel where
we feed in only the change in the tax rate and G/Y that took place in Mexico, the model
generates very smooth saving rates that indeed increase due to the decline in the tax rates
in 1986.
Figure 13: Saving Rate in Mexico: Counterfactual Experiments






























Note: The left plot compares the observed gross national saving rate in Mexico (“data,” blue/solid) against the counterfactual
case in which the only driving force that is active when simulating the model is the TFP growth rate and the remaining three
driving forces are set equal to their steady state levels (“TFP only,” red/marker). The right plot compares the observed
gross national saving rate in Mexico (“data,” blue/solid) against the counterfactual case in which the only two driving forces
that are active when simulating the model are the capital tax rates and the government spending shares while the remaining
two driving forces are set equal to their steady state levels (“Fiscal policy only”, red/marker). Both plots present also the
simulated series using the calibrated benchmark neoclassical model when all four driving forces are used (“benchmark,”
red/dashed). Sources: World Bank’s WDI and authors’ calculations.
Finally, we shut down all exogenous forces –fixing them at their average for the entire
simulation period– in order to confirm that variations in saving rates are little influenced
by initial conditions (K0).
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Figure 14: Saving Rate (additional counterfactuals): No Shocks





































Note: These plots compare the observed gross national saving rate in Colombia (“data,” blue/solid), against the model-
simulated saving rate where all driving forces are fixed at their average for the entire period (“No shock”, red/solid). Sources:
World Bank’s WDI and authors’ calculations.
A.3 Capacity Utilization
Finally, the figures below present the times series for TFP growth rate for Chile and Colom-
bia for the cases where capital is not adjusted for capacity utilization (benchmark) and
when it is (robustness) in the two countries of the three (and years) that we study for
which data on capital capacity utilization rates exist: Chile (1970-2010) and Colombia
(1980-2010). Results are strongly robust when one does account for this additional dimen-
sion. Indeed, TFP growth rates with and without capacity utilization rates are strongly
correlated in both Chile (0.98) and Colombia (0.85) for the sub periods mentioned above.
Figure 15: TFP With and Without Capacity Utilization


























Note: The TFP series are computed by pre-multiplying the capital stock (after NFA adjustments) by the capacity utilization
index. For Chile, the source for the utilization series is DIPRES (2016), while for Colombia the series is obtained from
Fedesarrollo’s Enterprise Survey (http://www.fedesarrollo.org.co/encuestas/boletines-empresarial-eoe/).
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A.4 Public vs Private Saving
We obtain (nominal) public and private saving rates from the IMF’s World Economic
Outlook25 and compare their evolution with respect to total saving rates. We present the
results from this comparison in Figure 16. In all three countries it is easy to see that private
saving rates closely trace the behavior of total saving rates. Moreover, the levels of private
and total saving rates are very close in Chile and Mexico even though government saving
rates deviate from the total saving rates at different times in the sample. In particular,
in Chile after 2003, private and public saving rates seem to run opposite to each other.
This may well be explained by the introduction of a fiscal rule, which dictated that the
government saved most of the surge in revenues that followed from the sharp increase in
copper prices during the mid-2000s. But fiscal rules are a very recent phenomenon, at least
in Latin America, and play no role in public/private saving behavior during most of our
sample.
Figure 16: Public Versus Private Saving
Note: These saving rates are obtained by dividing private and public saving in current units of local currency by gross
national disposable income. Source: IMF’s World Economic Outlook.
A.5 Convergence to the Steady State
Finally we provide an expanded version of Figure 3 which shows how the saving rate for
the three countries converges to its steady state.
25To obtain saving figures, the IMF subtracts (public/private/total) consumption expenditure from
gross national disposable income (GNDI), while we subtract from gross national income (GNI). The dif-
ference in final measures will be slim, but to produce consistent public and private gross national saving
rates using the IMF data, we first obtain GNDI by adding consumption expenditure and savings from the
IMF’s WEO. Then we obtain the ratio of savings to GNDI as our measures of public and private saving
rates.
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Figure 17: Saving Rate: Convergence to the Steady State
Note: The figure presents the model-simulated saving rate as it converges to the steady state (red line) along with the
observed saving rate (blue line). The shaded region represents the steady state convergence period.
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Table 4. Full Dataset Colombia
year TFP pop gov labor tax K-toY data Saving rate
1970 1.049 1.031 0.093 23.829 0.037 2.477 0.163
1971 1.054 1.032 0.112 23.772 0.043 2.402 0.132
1972 1.051 1.033 0.098 23.685 0.034 2.357 0.152
1973 1.032 1.033 0.097 23.581 0.035 2.320 0.172
1974 0.953 1.033 0.088 23.474 0.036 2.331 0.192
1975 1.010 1.035 0.091 23.886 0.039 2.391 0.167
1976 1.002 1.033 0.085 23.734 0.038 2.450 0.190
1977 1.066 1.032 0.078 23.946 0.028 2.477 0.211
1978 1.023 1.033 0.087 23.760 0.045 2.452 0.200
1979 1.017 1.034 0.094 23.581 0.027 2.508 0.191
1980 0.985 1.031 0.101 23.187 0.029 2.497 0.192
1981 1.015 1.033 0.106 23.401 0.030 2.544 0.160
1982 0.971 1.034 0.113 22.929 0.029 2.611 0.136
1983 1.023 1.032 0.114 22.103 0.026 2.607 0.141
1984 0.978 1.029 0.115 21.525 0.026 2.599 0.149
1985 1.031 1.027 0.112 21.378 0.026 2.573 0.162
1986 0.989 1.025 0.102 21.472 0.027 2.477 0.218
1987 1.036 1.024 0.091 21.929 0.031 2.502 0.193
1988 0.968 1.024 0.090 22.116 0.039 2.526 0.199
1989 1.036 1.024 0.097 22.535 0.039 2.603 0.185
1990 0.962 1.024 0.099 22.508 0.040 2.572 0.201
1991 1.026 1.024 0.097 23.418 0.063 2.652 0.198
1992 0.979 1.024 0.100 23.144 0.063 2.600 0.151
1993 1.030 1.024 0.104 24.134 0.057 2.557 0.162
1994 1.016 1.024 0.150 24.642 0.058 2.534 0.182
1995 1.040 1.023 0.155 25.148 0.057 2.513 0.180
1996 1.033 1.024 0.189 24.718 0.061 2.603 0.147
1997 1.022 1.024 0.209 24.601 0.060 2.514 0.131
1998 0.988 1.023 0.212 23.997 0.057 2.647 0.123
1999 0.936 1.022 0.231 22.937 0.074 2.914 0.119
2000 1.024 1.022 0.172 23.189 0.074 2.954 0.122
2001 1.018 1.021 0.173 22.888 0.082 2.923 0.107
2002 0.987 1.020 0.168 22.896 0.089 2.835 0.115
2003 0.997 1.020 0.165 23.177 0.090 2.813 0.123
2004 1.003 1.020 0.166 23.548 0.096 2.762 0.141
2005 1.015 1.018 0.166 24.011 0.099 2.703 0.152
2006 1.033 1.018 0.163 24.345 0.105 2.621 0.166
2007 1.077 1.018 0.162 24.812 0.105 2.576 0.167
2008 1.042 1.017 0.161 24.783 0.108 2.597 0.178
2009 0.984 1.016 0.173 24.388 0.111 2.701 0.173
2010 0.984 1.015 0.176 24.645 0.098 2.696 0.171
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Table 5. Full Dataset Chile
year TFP pop gov hh tax K-toY data Saving rate
1970 1.089 1.023 0.131 21.866 0.560 2.280 0.154
1971 0.941 1.024 0.155 22.176 0.560 2.175 0.128
1972 0.928 1.024 0.163 22.485 0.560 2.272 0.080
1973 1.123 1.024 0.133 22.178 0.560 2.361 0.055
1974 0.888 1.024 0.160 21.011 0.560 2.139 0.209
1975 1.007 1.025 0.163 19.708 0.560 2.233 0.079
1976 1.147 1.024 0.145 19.500 0.560 2.331 0.146
1977 1.013 1.024 0.142 19.851 0.560 2.133 0.154
1978 1.092 1.024 0.149 19.523 0.560 2.121 0.120
1979 1.052 1.024 0.148 19.397 0.560 2.009 0.124
1980 1.023 1.023 0.129 19.996 0.560 1.873 0.136
1981 0.898 1.024 0.138 19.959 0.560 1.887 0.079
1982 0.862 1.024 0.167 18.197 0.560 2.053 0.011
1983 1.067 1.023 0.156 18.986 0.560 2.231 0.038
1984 1.037 1.022 0.162 19.429 0.560 2.000 0.020
1985 1.029 1.021 0.154 20.211 0.560 1.793 0.080
1986 1.076 1.020 0.141 20.892 0.560 1.743 0.124
1987 0.988 1.020 0.120 21.304 0.560 1.639 0.184
1988 1.089 1.019 0.114 22.196 0.112 1.722 0.238
1989 1.003 1.019 0.110 22.998 0.112 1.616 0.248
1990 1.087 1.017 0.106 23.100 0.112 1.718 0.246
1991 1.113 1.017 0.105 23.158 0.112 1.624 0.235
1992 1.030 1.017 0.105 23.923 0.112 1.516 0.226
1993 1.024 1.017 0.109 24.947 0.112 1.467 0.221
1994 1.104 1.017 0.110 24.783 0.112 1.507 0.228
1995 1.050 1.017 0.108 24.849 0.112 1.466 0.258
1996 1.085 1.016 0.113 25.144 0.112 1.465 0.232
1997 0.977 1.016 0.115 24.671 0.104 1.423 0.232
1998 0.965 1.016 0.118 25.283 0.102 1.499 0.218
1999 1.034 1.017 0.128 24.354 0.097 1.658 0.208
2000 1.023 1.017 0.120 24.220 0.107 1.639 0.206
2001 0.977 1.017 0.121 23.866 0.110 1.676 0.195
2002 0.975 1.018 0.123 23.974 0.115 1.746 0.192
2003 0.982 1.017 0.121 24.318 0.111 1.812 0.203
2004 1.031 1.016 0.117 24.483 0.118 1.938 0.223
2005 0.918 1.015 0.114 24.180 0.144 1.981 0.237
2006 1.026 1.015 0.113 24.317 0.170 2.258 0.253
2007 1.119 1.014 0.116 24.203 0.174 2.398 0.251
2008 0.960 1.014 0.121 24.171 0.160 2.167 0.223
2009 1.025 1.014 0.135 23.445 0.108 2.458 0.229
2010 1.043 1.013 0.132 23.797 0.133 2.423 0.235
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Table 6. Full Dataset Mexico
year TFP pop gov hh tax K-toY data saving rate
1970 0.950 1.032 0.074 20.355 0.410 1.300 0.194
1971 1.017 1.032 0.078 20.778 0.410 1.413 0.177
1972 1.026 1.033 0.088 21.208 0.410 1.449 0.181
1973 0.982 1.034 0.093 21.627 0.410 1.452 0.191
1974 0.969 1.030 0.093 22.035 0.410 1.520 0.196
1975 1.006 1.032 0.106 22.685 0.410 1.610 0.192
1976 0.966 1.033 0.113 22.889 0.410 1.582 0.189
1977 1.039 1.033 0.111 23.076 0.410 1.677 0.208
1978 1.033 1.031 0.112 23.406 0.410 1.676 0.208
1979 1.024 1.034 0.112 24.057 0.410 1.674 0.223
1980 1.044 1.032 0.104 24.719 0.410 1.679 0.223
1981 0.971 1.031 0.112 24.785 0.410 1.676 0.217
1982 0.882 1.031 0.113 24.878 0.410 1.508 0.225
1983 0.978 1.033 0.094 24.240 0.410 1.851 0.258
1984 1.014 1.034 0.098 24.474 0.410 1.943 0.233
1985 0.930 1.035 0.097 24.847 0.410 1.828 0.225
1986 0.997 1.035 0.097 24.792 0.410 1.803 0.177
1987 0.906 1.034 0.092 24.813 0.410 1.786 0.216
1988 1.007 1.032 0.088 24.859 0.101 2.186 0.208
1989 1.029 1.030 0.086 24.995 0.101 2.183 0.199
1990 1.053 1.030 0.087 25.127 0.101 2.134 0.194
1991 1.007 1.029 0.093 24.447 0.101 2.101 0.182
1992 0.994 1.028 0.102 24.500 0.101 2.098 0.160
1993 1.029 1.026 0.133 24.790 0.101 2.151 0.191
1994 0.889 1.025 0.128 25.398 0.096 1.986 0.200
1995 1.001 1.024 0.137 24.750 0.076 2.213 0.185
1996 1.013 1.023 0.129 25.529 0.070 2.243 0.175
1997 1.051 1.022 0.124 26.979 0.078 2.165 0.179
1998 0.983 1.022 0.119 26.208 0.081 2.183 0.173
1999 1.049 1.020 0.117 26.836 0.086 2.196 0.175
2000 0.976 1.019 0.115 26.065 0.087 2.263 0.161
2001 0.949 1.018 0.116 25.300 0.093 2.437 0.142
2002 1.017 1.017 0.117 26.028 0.083 2.494 0.144
2003 1.026 1.018 0.115 25.164 0.074 2.570 0.193
2004 0.986 1.020 0.108 25.350 0.065 2.544 0.211
2005 1.041 1.021 0.109 25.777 0.066 2.562 0.202
2006 1.048 1.022 0.108 25.551 0.069 2.517 0.215
2007 0.961 1.022 0.108 25.234 0.074 2.519 0.214
2008 0.961 1.022 0.111 25.816 0.077 2.588 0.208
2009 0.965 1.022 0.122 23.924 0.079 2.898 0.199
2010 1.024 1.021 0.118 25.908 0.080 2.802 0.203
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